




























1. Day three of the McLuhan Culture Technologies Con-
vergence Conference, entitled "The Business of Cul-
ture;' took place, appropriately enough, in the rehearsal
hall of the Joey and Toby Tannenbaum Opera Centre.
Whether this rehearsal would result in tragedy or buffo
had yet to be determined. What was to be operated
upon that day was the cultural institution, particularly
the museum, in an attempt to transplant new technolo-
gies in the hope of revivification.
In a sort of analogue to "the king is dead -long live the king;' the pre-
sumption was that the cultural institution (the museum, the art gallery,
the library) was moribund, largely as a consequence of inaccessibility. The
"new technologies" offered a glimmer of hope for the restoration of the
repositories of culture to their rightful place.
In his opening remarks, moderator Robert Fulford referred to muse-
ums and libraries as "memory machines;' a phrase that reminded me of
Freud's magic tablet. The Wiinderblock is a memory machine; it is in the
wax itself, underneath the onion skin, that the impressions are registered.
The wax tablet is, at the same time, a palimpsest with each memory dis-
figured as a new one is written over top. The museum, on the other hand,
seems less like a palimpsest, and more like an accretion, in which the
weight of the top layers does not appear to crush the material below.
With the tablet, it is a question of how to recover repressed memories
which have been obliterated by subsequent writings; with the museum,
the problem seems to be, not the recovery of memory, but making sense of
the flood of de-realized images. The problem is not unlocking the store-
house, but finding the key to the code of the objects arranged inside.
If, however, these repositories represent a dead history, it is not imme-
diately clear how the transformation of artifacts into data could reactivate
their souls. The notion that they are dead begs the question as to how
they died in the first place. Thus, any post-mortem would logically begin
with an autopsy inquiring into the cause of death. If the history locked
inside these objects no longer serves "the needs of the present", then it is
not at all apparent how the application of new technologies can effect
their status.
At the conference, the arias for the new redemptive technologies were
rehearsed on a raised dais, performed against a black velvet limbo-curtain
backdrop: a black hole that signals the possibility of the erasure of history
in favour of the staging and re-staging of an ever-present. The "business"
of culture hovered in this darkness like a miasma in a seance, in the form
of an ironized]etzt-Zeit (Benjamin's "now-time"), as if - to mix similes-
the wax skin had been permanently peeled off of the Wiinderblock, the sty-
Ius waving in thin air. Black holes, as we know, suck the light out of
everything. What kind of ray machine, then, what kind of tractor beam,
would be needed in order to illuminate the memory potentials locked
inside the museum's store room?
Next to the singers was a large baroque table upon which sat a num-
ber of computers. Unlike the image of the black hole, here we seemed to
have something more concrete. Of course, since we were in the opera, this
was not a real table but a stage table, performing as a baroque table. Even
though this pretense made its meaning fragile and confused, the table
nevertheless reminded us that, somewhere, furniture is required, both as a
cultural and as a material substrate: a computer must rest on something.
Again, this poses the question of history, but in a slightly different way.
The image of limbo requires us to ask whether new music can be played
without regard for that which it supersedes; alternately, the table reminds
us that culture does not emerge ex nihilo. The latter, however, also leads us
to consider what meaning the cultural substrate provides for the needs of
the present, if any at all.
We thus begin with three images: memory machine, black hole, table-
top. Each of these images, as will be seen below, invoke other images:
images of memory, from memory, of history. My task will be simply to try
and build some bridges between these images, in the hopes of provoking,
if not satisfying, curiosity about images and their history: through the
image, a reflection on the image.
The conference presenters suggested that merely opening up access to
the storehouses of memory, replacing the order of the word with the order
of the image, would in itself be adequate to empower individual and col-
lective recollection. We have to ask whether this is sufficient. The "new
technologies" offer a glimmer of hope in this regard, but nevertheless
mediate our experience of the souvenir as problematically as the conven-
tional museum. By offering potentially universal access, the question of
history itself is left undisturbed. In the end, it is the damage caused by
history that must be addressed, which cannot be redeemed by merely
making images of and from history available.
According to Marshall McLuhan, "we impose the form of the old on the
content of the new."l In McLuhan's formulation, new media would act (at
least initially) as support for the content of the media it had superseded.
This notion is perhaps most easily recognized in the advent of television,
which in its earliest days was seen as a medium perfectly suited for the
transmission of theatre.2 In time, however, television moved from this
. hybrid period to the discovery of its "specific form;' - a process described
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elsewhere by McLuhan.3 Keeping this in mind, it could be argued that to
transpose the theatre onto television marks an imposition on the video
medium which, because it is not the stage, requires its own distinct aes-
thetic form. It is the discovery of a new medium's proper form that would
mark the moment when it came into its own. That this was so in the case
of television lends some empirical weight to McLuhan's formula. Its
value, however, is belied to some extent by being caught within the web
of modernity - particularly its aesthetic component - insofar as the nega-
tive dimension of his claim rests on a notion of ontological specificity as it
applies to each medium. The kind of progressivism that motivates his
claim is evident in the implicit devaluation of the old as an imposition on
the creative potential of the new.
In a further refinement of this dictum, McLuhan remarks that "In
the name of 'progress', our official culture is striving to force the new
media to do the work of the 0Id."4 This idea of force underlines
McLuhan's insistence that new media have different "work" to do. Fur-
ther, the invocation of the term "progress" takes us to the core of moder-
nity. Expressed again in the form of a negative judgement, this claim is
warranted to the degree that progress requires that the past be over-
come, obliterated, in favour of the ever-new. The militaristic implica-
tions are clear: a battle is to be waged with the old (against "official
culture") in order to capture the terrain of the new. Again, this has its
aesthetic manifestation in the rhetoric of the avant-garde. The traces of
military rhetoric in McLuhan are reminiscent of earlier battles fought on
the terrain of culture: we are reminded, not so accidentally, of the
"querelle entre les anciens et modernes."
Occurring in the late seventeenth-century, this quarrel was the prod-
uct of the erosion of the authority of tradition with regard to both knowl-
edge and taste. With the emergence of the subject through Cartesian
thought and the empiricism of Bacon, the "modems" asserted their ratio-
nalist claim to superiority over the ancients. According to Matei Cali-
nescu, this quarrel "resulted in the liberation of reason from the
restricting fetters imposed on it by the renaissance idolatry of classical
antiquity."5 The quarrel rested on the tension between a future orientation
and one which looked to the past. McLuhan's comments replay this argu-
ment in a contemporary setting, and seek to release us, as did the original
modems, from the "fetters" of idolatry of the past.
If we return to our image of the baroque table, however, we observe
the relation between the past and the future in a different way. Here, the
old supports the new; the table provides a surface for the computer.
McLuhan's statements try to evade this, implying that it is the cultural
substrate itself - the table - that hinders progress. As Lynn Spigel has
shown in relation to domestic space - again in the case of television - the
problem has to do with furniture. 6 It is not therefore just a matter of old
content being imposed on the form of a new medium's software, but also
the physical dilemma of where to put the hardware. We thus have a set of
material conditions which must be met: the computer provides access to a
dematerialized cyberspace which is nevertheless located somewhere in
physical space. In addition, it rests on a set of material supports (the
table, e.g.) that have been produced within and through a social and cul-
tural configuration.
This leads us to another striking image, attributed to Bernard of
Chartres in the early twelfth century, in which we can uncover a direct
analogue to our computers on the tabletop. The image is that of "dwarfs
on giant's shoulders." In this simile, the dwarves are the moderns,
standing atop the giants of the past. The implication is that the knowl-
edge of the moderns is small in comparison to the accumulated tradition
of their forebears, but, that by standing astride this tradition, they are
nevertheless able to see further than those who came before them.
As Calinescu writes:
Bernard's simile is vivid and easy to visualize, which explains its immediate
imaginative appeal; and its subtle ambiguity succeeds in reconciling some of
the basic claims of the moderni (namely, that they occupy a more advanced
position in comparison to the ancients) with the requirements of an age for
which tradition was still the only reliable source of value.... It was certainly
the ambiguity, by which one enjoyed the freedom to stress only one of the
two meanings combined in the metaphor, that made Bernard's dictum into a
rhetorical commonplace.7
This simile poses a very different relationship to the past than that encap-
sulated in McLuhan's dicta, yet Bernard's simile foreshadows McLuhan's
ambivalence through the very ambiguity underlined by Calinescu. What
is perhaps most striking is the sense of modesty in relation to the past
contained in this figure, as contrasted with more recent acts of hubris. It
is perhaps indicative of the hubris of our own moderni that Bernard's sim-
ile should be nothing but a rhetorical commonplace today.
Here, if we are acute enough, we can recognize the role of the baroque
as the mannered vengeance of the modern on the classical. Our table func-
tions as a pastiche, reminding us that the baroque was always-already
far;ade. It also reminds us of the decadent side of modernity, and the prob-
lematic potential of spectacle shorn of tradition. This critique, or, perhaps
more accurately, this fear of the image, stretches back at least to
Rousseau's Lettre aM. d'Alembert, if not to Plato's quarrel with mimesis.
The images of the baroque and the electro-modern are (over)saturated














Here, then, comes our question about furniture: what is furnished; on
what do we rest?
It seems that, unlike McLuhan's adage, the content of the old is that
of the new; indeed, it is the persistence of particular frames of debate and
discourses that is most striking. The old dichotomies of high-culture
versus low-culture, old versus new, dominant versus marginal mark the
debates as indelibly as they have since the transmission of classical culture
became the centre of debate in the Middle Ages. This was particularly
true of certain of the conference participants. For instance, Grant
McCracken, curator at the Royal Ontario Museum in Toronto, could not
seem to get beyond a discussion of what 'he claimed was an intellectual
disdain for popular culture. In contrast, Ihor Holubisky privileged art as
the locus of transformative possibilities, dismissing popular culture in the
very terms McCracken problematized. The persistent reproduction of the
same debates simply marked the reiteration of predispositions in which
the production of value remained unexamined.
In the introduction to his lecrure, Hans Peter Schwarz, director of the
ZKM Media Museum in Karlsruhe, pointed out that within progressive
modernity liberation from the myth of nature was replaced by the myth
of technological emancipation. Schwarz reminded us that the critique of
this myth, in Germany at least, was non-partisan, and could be found in
the work of both Heidegger on the right and the Frankfurt School on the
left. In the "Question Concerning Technology;' Heidegger warns that
nature (and therefore humans as well) risks becoming "standing reserve;'
that is, mere potential energy (labour power in the case of humans). 8 Like-
wise, Adorno and Horkheimer emerged with the concept of Zweckrational-
itcit, or instrumental reason, which reduced humanity in a similar fashion
to a resource in a cost-benefit logic.9 Each of these describe, in differing
ways, the extent to which technologies - contrary to the myth of libera-
tion - represent further forms of enslavement, indeed the enslavement of
nature itself. Hubris enters with the assumption that liberation from
nature assymbolized by technologies would imply freedom.
The museum, as a "memory machine;' is an interesting case in point.
As a technology, the museum is certainly involved in the recirculation of
the past. Does it, however, participate in an instrumental logic? If muse-
ums are "the family sepulchres of works of art;' it would seem that, as a
technology, museums produce the death of history. Rather than function-
ing as the storehouse of memory, they work to suck memory out of culture
in order to leave the lifeworld free to become fully instrumentalized.
The museum thus re-presents history bereft of meaning, a history in
which meaning is overtaken by display value. The question to be posed
with regard to new technologies is whether this recirculation promises a
re-membering, or whether it functions more as a dis-membering - a
return to the gravitational pull of the black hole.
We must therefore ask, in relation to new technologies, what it means
to take up the "challenge;' as the director of the Canadian Museum of
Civilization, George MacOonald put it, to digitize "cultural fragments"
so that "virtual museums" could function as "nodal points for dispersed
ethnicity." What MacOonald referred to as a "digital resynthesis" of cul-
tural artifacts is proposed as a counter-diasporic strategy on behalf of
those cultures desiccated and dispersed by colonial power. In the absence
of an in situ culture, "virtual ethnicity" emerges as the means by which to
reconstitute power lost in the transactions with imperial nations. Mac-
Oonald's proposal is simultaneously compelling and highly problematic.
It is easy enough to detect the residues of Enlightenment thinking here,
and the temptation to dismiss this as another instance of technological
utopianism is seductive. His gambit nevertheless poses the question of the
liberatory potential hidden within artifacts which cannot be avoided. Do
they act merely as "standing reserve;' understood in the negative sense
employed by Heidegger? Or, does this suggest a hitherto overlooked posi-
tive dimension to "standing reserve;' in which these artifacts, if properly
revealed, have redemptive capacities?
In terms of aesthetic experience, we have certainly treated artistic
works as harbouring such potential; theories of aesthetic experience such
as that of Hans Robert Jauss are exemplary in this regard. 1O Such theories,
however, are rendered problematic by certain modernist aesthetic theories,
particularly those emerging from the Frankfurt School, in which affinity
to works of art have withered away. Consider this comment by Habermas:
Perhaps it is typical of the ahistorical mode of perception proper to aesthetic
modernity that particular epochs lose their own profile in favor of a heroic
affinity of the present with the most remote and the most primitive:
The decadent strives to relate itself in a leap to the barbaric, the wild, and
the primitive. l1
Here, there is nothing but the present (dwelling in the shadow of a for-
gotten myth of origins) in which the semantic potential of myth itself
remains hidden. If any identity remains, it is in a form shorn of historical
meaning and consigned to the irrationality of a pure aesthetic, a "cramped
optics that render one insensible to the traces and the existing forms of
communicative rationality."12 Arguably, the recirculation of cultural frag-
ments is undertaken within this perspective - hence the hubris of the
assumption that a database could restore the aura of power to cultural
artifacts and provide the conditions whereby they might communicate
that power.













redeemed is to take the notion of "standing reserve" in a whole new direc-
tion. Here, the "dubious continuum of empty time" (as Lutz Niethammer
expresses it) is open to the "activation of alternative traditions."13 The
hope is that the continuous recirculation of images shorn of meaning can
be replaced by a principle that would bring to light the meaning of his-
tory and mobilize it in the present. Niethammer is referring to Benjamin,
who he claims "was recalling the hopes of redemption stored in the reli-
gious tradition, so as to introduce them as a meaning and yardstick into
human contact with history - both in reference to the past and for politi-
cal action in the present."14 This, then, would be to treat the notion of
"standing reserve;' in a positive sense; that is, as a history in which the
religious tradition (embodied in artifacts) can be brought forth as a set of
potentials held up as exemplary for present day behaviour. That technol-
ogy might also reduce culture (as it does nature) to a reservoir of potential
energy might just, following MacDonald's logic, provide the conditions
necessary for the reactivation of history and culture. Thus, it may be pos-
sible, given the resources of "existing forms of communicative rationality"
that Habermas insists are still available, to claim a potential value in the
reconstruction of culrure via new technologies, rather than remaining in
the dismissive stance of continuous negative critique.
The idea that there exists an underlying principle that animates his-
tory is clearly central to Benjamin's thought. In the first of his "Theses on
the Philosophy of History;' Benjamin describes "an automaton con-
structed in such a way that it could play a winning game of chess."15
Underneath the chess table, "a little hunchback who was an expert chess
player sat inside and guided the puppet's hand by means of strings." Here,
Bernard's dwarf reappears, but in a new guise. As Benjamin comments on
this machine:
One can imagine a philosophical counterpart to this device. The puppet
called "historical materialism" is to win all the time. It can easily be a match
for anyone if it enlists the services of theology, which today, as we know, is
wizened and has to keep out of sight.
Benjamin suggests that an underlying principle - theology - acts as
the resource that would allow history to be put into play in the present.
Behind materialism thus stands an important figure which allows it to
win the match. The assumption is that in the converse situation - in the
absence of theology - historical materialism would be unlikely to win.
History thus has no meaning without an activating principle, which Ben-
jamin implies still continues despite its hidden character. Thus, some-
thing more than mere analysis is required; what is needed is a way to
discover the principle that would activate history and make it real.
Benjamin's image of a wizened theology can be mapped quite success-
fully onto the contemporary moment. The dwarf here is in fact not the
modern in Bernard's simile, but the giant of the past, shrunken almost
beyond recognition. Despite its hidden character, the dwarfnevertheless
manages to keep the machine running, even th(')ugh we may no longer
realize it. History, like theology, is indeed kept far out of sight in the pre-
sent, which potentially accounts for the inability for some sort of rescuing
critique to ignite the imagination.
3. For McLuhan, attachment to the past was highly problematic. Indeed, his
resistance to history. leads him to decry our tendency to seek comfort in
the familiar:
When faced with a totally new situation, we tend always to attach ourselves
to the objects, to the flavor of the most recent past. We look at the present
through a rear-view mirror. We march backwards into the future. 16
Not only is history to be left behind, but any comfort it may offer is to be
disdained. Only the cold warrior is equipped to face the future head-on.
In a way, this statement implies a need that is being overlooked: the past
may offer some sort of hope because the future looks so bleak. It is thus
somewhat ironic to discuss the museum within the context of McLuhan's
thought. It's attachment to the past, and its fetishization of objects of
memory constitute a restraint. The production of history becomes diffi-
cult under this regime.
It was precisely the liberation from history that would be, for
McLuhan, the path to redemption. As Arthur Kroker points our,
McLuhan "privileges the aesthetic value of creative freedom as the locus
of a 'redeemed' human civilization."17 It is not clear though, what kind
of redemption it would produce as its result. To describe McLuhan in this
way is to implicate him in what Habermas finds so abhorrent in Niet-
zsche, namely, the aestheticization of power, in which thought is exiled
into value judgements alone. It is also to succumb to a purely negative
critique in which redemption is in fact unavailable, given the groundless-
ness created by the substitution of aesthetic value for reason. This is the
aporia into which the Frankfurt School drove itself (as Habermas points
out),18 although unlike McLuhan, as part of an unrelenting attack on the
idea of progress itself. For the Frankfurt School, it was the spectre of rea-
son gone awry - in the name of progress - that was destructive; with
McLuhan, unreason in the form of enslavement to history was the shadow
to be battled with.
McLuhan's image of the rear-view mirror finds its doppelganger yet
again in Benjamin. In the ninth and most famous "thesis;' Benjamin












His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one
pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we
perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling
wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would
like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a
storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such vio-
lence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels
him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris
before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress. 19
Again, a similar image leads to an altogether different conclusion. To
imagine that historical time unfolds in a linear fashion is an illusion; it is
in fact "one single catastrophe." Progress here is a storm which prevents
the angel from awakening the dead, which is to say, prevents it from
releasing the potentials of history itself. The wind of progress blows with
such force that the angel cannot stop itself.
McLuhan insists that we are also blown backwards into the future,
or at least, that we constantly look backwards. This is only true in Ben-
jamin's example however, if we identify with the angel itself. Yet, to do
so, in the conditions described by Benjamin, would be another act of
hubris. This is precisely the act of identification McLuhan presupposes
when he recommends that we should wrench our eyes from the mirror
and direct them towards the road. Benjamin, however, makes it quite
clear that the "we" in this predicament are quite distinct from the "he;'
the angel. The "we" - us - inhabit an illusion: the idea that progress
would lead to freedom. Thus, "the significance" of this image, as
Niethammer writes, "involves an opposition between the angel's view
(catastrophe) and ours (events, progress)... ."20
What is important then, is not imagining that we are the angel, but
rather trying to grasp what it is that the angel sees:
He is startled at what he sees, because he cannot console himself with the
philosophical promises that future history will indemnify the victims of the
past according to a cost-benefit model of calculation. What is swept away by
the history of progress piles up at his feet like massed debris of disappoint-
ments, defeats, and sacrifices. But the victims no longer have access to the
power of religious redemption; for in the raging wind of disenchantment the
angel is driven up and away.21
4. The promises have been made again and again. The most recent are those
claims made on behalf of the new technologies. Again, it is the future
that promises to make good on the sins of the past. The reinheritance of
one's ethnicity via a database, for instance, is presumed to rectify the dis-
persion of cultural artifacts brought about by colonialism.
Of course, political economy and institutional analyses would provide
a pessimistic response to that promise - as they always do. However,
recent research on the semiotic potential of popular culture suggests that
meaning is not always foreclosed. This at least allows for the possibility
that consumption is not merely passive, but at minimum acts to reconsti-
tute the sign-value of popular images. 22 The array of signs at least holds
out the promise of identity formation as the result of adapting images for
one's own use.
The agency that is suggested by this, however, is limited to just that
- the manipulation of signs. This identity, although formidable, is also,
from an historical perspective, empty. Here, the promise of a politics
born from the destruction of aura 'once yearned for by Benjamin is left
unfulfilled. 23 The explosion of aura marks, if anything, the end of the
image's power. As Niethammer describes of a character in one of Ernst
Jiinger's novels:
with the derealization of meta-narrative systems of meaning, history has
degenerated into a video archive of past forms and events, whose fascination
consoled him for the loss of any meaning in his existence and in the world.24
Video archive, database, what would be the difference? The individual
seeking reconstitution through virtual ethnicity is,
constantly faced with fragments of the past w'hich alienate him from his own
historical situation and subjectivity. They do not make him present to him-
self, but flood him with the past and thereby allow him to escape from his
historical existence.25
It appears, therefore, that the circulation of images of the past serves only
to produce more alienation. Ironically, this was to be overcome by mod-
ernist art, whose alienating experience would point precisely to the
unhappiness - and alienation - of the present. This, however, backfired.
The opacity of modernist works of art merely produced more alienation,
rather than shattering the hard crust of instrumental reason, as it was pre-
sumed to do. Since art was apparently incommunicado until better times,
it hardly provided the force necessary to recover the humane values that
were supposed to be sequestered inside it.
The question, obviously, is whether the semantic potential hidden
within history can be released, or whe~her it must remain mute; whether
it is possible for theology to emerge from under the table and stand to
full height, or not. The recirculation of cultural imagery via the new
technologies seems to make that promise, but experience suggests that it
will not be so.
As a possible remedy, we might return again to the idea of "existing













rience of being flooded with images of the past does not make the subject
present to him or herself. We might, however, employ a distinction
between kinds of experience, as brought out in German. In that language
it is possible to distinguish (philosophically at least) between two types of
experience: Erlebnis and Erfahrung:
In the context of aesthetics, and specifically within the framework ·of Leben-
sphilosophie, the term Erlebnis has been preferred. Generally translated as 'lived
experience', it postulates the primacy of experience over reflection.... If
reflection is conceived of as Erfahrung, it will not stand in an abstract relation
to lived experience and become the locus of reification.... {I}t is the whole
human person, as an empirically existing individual, that is engaged in
Erfahrung, whereas Erlebnis is but the fodder of reflection.26
In this formulation, Erfahrung comes to represent the superior term,
translating the merely lived experience into the substance for reflection on
the self. It would be here that the subject might look forward to the
recapturing of the self, by way of a mediating reflection on (the specificity
of individual) history.
For Adorno, Erlebnis implied a form of unteflective experience, similar
to the derealization described by Niethammer. The subject is merely
bombarded with iinages whose meaning remains bottled up, and in which
the individual is lost. However, the concept of Erlebnis is nevertheless cru-
cial in the way it asserts the intersubjective aspects of experience over
against '~dorno's insistence on the radical and never subsumable individ-
uality of each subject [which] prevented any solutl.on to what appears to
be a monadic existence for the individuaL"27 Reasserting the intersubjec-
tive dimension of Erlebnis "grounds it in a communicational framework
within which it becomes possible for individuals to share experience ...
without surrendering, at least ostensibly, the co-primacy of reflection
implied by Erfahrung." As Jauss points out, Adorno's aesthetic theory "has
been purchased at the price of a derogation of all communicative func-
tions."28 The substance of this criticism is that Adorno'sversion of reflec-
tive experience (Erfahrung) eliminated any of the intersubjective and
communicative possibilities arising from interaction with works of art;
these are (for Adorno) held in trust for the future. Jauss attempts to
restore the idea of identification by reappropriating Erlebnis to represent
the communicative and intersubjective dimensions of aesthetic experience.
In other words, Jauss argues that the potential exists in the present for the
reconciliation of work and world, which Adorno denied.
Here, however, we run into the terms of aesthetic experience itself.
Modernist aesthetics implied the shrinking of aesthetic experience and the
withdrawal of the work of art from direct engagement with the quotidian.
Faced with a lifeworld overcome by instrumental reason, art became the
last refuge of another way of being, one which was cut off from the life-
world by its very difference from it. However, rather than remaining
sealed off from the everyday, Jauss insists that the experience of the work
of art can mediate our relation to social experience, both retrospectively
and with regard to the future; encounters with works of art can revise the
experience of situations already encountered, or provide models that
anticipate and orient future experience. Identification with exemplary
works of art can prompt action leading to a restructuring of the lifeworld.
This would overcome the purely "affirmative" character of identification
in Adorno's schema, by insisting that identification is not given at the
outset, but can be either affirmative, that is, norm-fulfilling, or negative,
that is, leading to the critique of norms.
This functions to allay our suspicions vis-a.-vis the relationship
between aesthetic experience and the everyday, but it leaves untouched the
idea of religious power that underwrites the redemptive eschatology of
both Adorno and Benjamin. Basically, we are stuck with the same prob-
lem with which we began: can the "digital resynthesis" of culture that
George MacDonald proposes hope to offer a way out? Both Jauss and
Habermas, in differing ways, reach for a concept of communication to
overcome the problem of deferral. Restoring or recognizing existing com-
municative potentials is taken as the pathway by which to speed up the
coming of redemption.
Not surprisingly, this takes us immediately toward new technologies,
and the expanded possibilities for communication. The consistent reply to .
the expansion of communication networks has been that we are threat-
ened by oversaturation and desensitization. Against this possibility is
counterpoised the ideal of "genuine" communication, usually of the face-
to-face kind originaliy described by John Dewey as the "great commu-
nity." The breakdown of the social, and of communication, is seen as the
product of the very expansion of the possibilities of communication. This
conservative view is idealist, and overlooks the fact that all media, as
Habermas once put it, are dirty. Any notion of pure communication rests
on an idealist assumption.
The absence of a principle, or of a theology, appears to prevent the
possibility of restoring relations between historical objects and the pre-
sent. For those connected with the Frankfurt School, the antidote took
form as the "principle of hope;' as Ernst Bloch expressed it. More recently,
and against the pessimism and messianic tendencies of the Frankfurt
School, the principle of communication has come to stand in as the locus
of redemption. This presents itself as a theology, as a faith in communica-
tion itself. Despite the perils of impure media, the belief in "existing













the shell of unhappiness by "break[ing} the spell of mythic thinking with-
out incurring a loss of light radiating from the semantic potentials also
hidden in myth."29
If nothing else, this faith implies a process of restoration and recon-
struction - especially with regard to aesthetics. This would mean an over-
haul of the essentialism and self-referentiality of modernist discourses.
This is precisely what ]auss calls for: overcoming the pure negativity of
Adorno by means of identification - with both its positive and its nega-
tive potentials. Identification can either "serve as a means of ideological
obfuscation;' or "question or break through customary behavioural
norms."30 There is, as ]auss suggests, a continuum of forms of identifica-
tion stretching between these extremes. The advantage of this is that it
leaves open the dual possibilities of affirmation and negation. Rather than
staking out the terrain of presumed forms of reception, it implies that
responses are open.
A combination of the ban on images in the Old Testament and the Pla-
tonic fear of mimesis have problematized the relation between ourselves
and artifacts, as well as inflecting our discussions of that relation. The
negative critique of the image over the centuries has been informed by
attitudes formed under the influence of these two ancient dispositions.
It is these attitudes that must be broken open before any discussion of
new technologies can occur. We must begin by' examining the question of
the power of the image, and the fear it provokes. It is not the possibility
of image monopolies that is to be feared, except to the extent that the
imposition of new forms of circulation merely mark the return of the
same. Rather, we might begin by bringing into the light the root of that
fear itself, overburdened as it is by the traditional response to the power
of the image. This in turn suggests that semantic power still lurks behind
images, and that residual traces of their auratic potential can be detected.
The fear is that the image may be untrue, and thus misleading. It is,
however, an open question as to whether any essential ontological truth
can be discovered behind them.
Technology will not tell us the answer to this. The failure of the
museum as a technology, as a memory machine, already demonstrates this
fact .. A dead history cannot be brought back to life merely by reconstitut-
ing its residues in another form. We cannot place our trust, therefore, in
the future if it will not make good on the past - this would be just fur-
ther empty time.
The redemptive possibilities of history will not be found in the debris
of progress. To rec-irculate images of the past in a new form only serves to
make the accumulated mountain of catastrophe higher, and risks smother-
ing us. Again our tabletop: the computer makes the promise that we
could fly like the angels, another episoc;le in the forgetting of the body,
another dream of philosophy. Yet there it is: a computer resting, some-
where, on a tabletop, which in turn might be resting on top of that
mou"ntain of debris, forgotten because our eyes are shut. The very core of
the problem of that history must be researched before the past can be
redeemed. Until then, the sleep of forgetfulness continues, and the former
pure radiance will not pierce the darkness.
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